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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel physical keyless car
sharing system where users can use and share their cars without
the need of physical keys. It also provides a comprehensive
security and privacy analysis of such a system. It first presents
a high-level model for a keyless car sharing system, describ-
ing its main entities and specifying the necessary functional
requirements to allow users to share their cars (with other
users) without exchanging physical keys. Based on this model
and functional requirements, the paper presents a comprehensive
threat analysis of the system. It focuses on the threats affecting
the system’s security and the users’ privacy. This analysis results
in a specification of an extensive set of security and privacy
requirements for the system. This work can be used as a guide
for a future keyless car sharing system design and as a mean to
assess the security and privacy risks imposed on users by such
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Keyless car systems allow users to access (i.e., lock and
unlock) and drive a car without the need of a physical key, as
these keys can be replaced by access credentials on portable
devices such as smartphones, or tablets. Keyless car sharing
systems allow users to share digital car keys with other
users such as family members, friends and acquaintances.
The combination of car sharing systems and dynamic key
distribution offers a high potential for smart cities.
Nowadays, the smart city concept has been gaining
widespread attention as it would allow cities to manage their
available resources and assets in a more effective, efficient
and sustainable manner [1]. Managing efficiently the usage
of transportation assets is one of the biggest challenges in
modern cities. One way to address this challenge is to reduce
the number of cars by better utilising the already available cars:
note that the average time utilization of a car is 5%, which
implies that on average 95% of the time cars are standing in
a parking lot or garage. Encouraging users to share their cars
with others can help to decrease the number of cars in cities.
This could be achieved via car sharing systems. Such systems
provide individuals with access to cars of other users. Users
can reserve one of the available cars parked somewhere in the
city and pay based on the time traveled and distance covered.
In contrast to traditional car rental companies, car sharing
systems can provide a relatively inexpensive alternative to
users who occasionally need a car [2].
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Even if car sharing systems exist today, they are not flexible
enough in terms of users’ convenience. For example, if a
car owner is willing to share her car, the user (or another
designated person) has to hand over the physical keys to the
user who wants to use the car. In some situations, handing a
physical key may not even be possible.
To address the aforementioned issue, we propose a novel
physical Keyless car Sharing System (KSS) which would
allow car owners to generate digital keys for accessing their
cars, and to share these keys with other users. It aims to
eliminate the need for a physical key hand-over. However, such
a KSS can introduce several privacy and security challenges.
Currently, there is no prior work that analyses the security and
privacy implications of physical Keyless car sharing systems.
Additionally, there is no work that methodologically specifies
the security and privacy requirements. The main contributions
of this paper are the following:
• Firstly, we propose a novel high-level model for a KSS
which allows a car owner to share her car by generating
and distributing digital car keys to other users.
• Secondly, we define a threat model and perform a security
and privacy threat analysis of the proposed KSS.
• Thirdly, based on this threat analysis, we specify the
security and privacy requirements that need to be fulfilled,
to allow owners to share their cars as well as users to book
and use cars in a secure and privacy-preserving manner.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II provides the background information and discusses the
related work. Section III proposes a novel KSS. Section IV
analyses the potential security threats and attacks on the
proposed system. Section V specifies a set of security and
privacy requirements. Section VI provides further discussions
before concluding the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Weikl and Bogenberger [3] first analysed and evaluated
different relocation algorithms for car sharing systems. They
proposed a model for optimal vehicle positioning and re-
location. Their model has an off-line and on-line demand
module. The offline demand module calculates the optimal
car pick-up location based on yearly data, whereas the on-line
demand module performs the calculations several times per
day based on real-time data. Shaheen and Cohen [4] provided
a global perspective of markets and emerging trends in car
sharing services. They concluded that car sharing services are
becoming popular and that they provide significant benefits
for society such as reduced CO2 emissions and fewer sold
cars. Shaheen et al. [5] investigated personal car sharing sys-
tems and explored the business models, market opportunities
and service barriers of such systems. They concluded that
personal car sharing systems have the potential to impact
the transportation sector and provide greater alternatives to
vehicle ownership. They also pointed out that the most chal-
lenging issues such systems face are efficient key transfers
between users and reliable reputation mechanisms to rate
users. Shaheen and Chan [6] discussed the evolution and
feasibility of electric vehicle in car sharing business models.
Ferrero et al. [7], [8] reviewed different car sharing systems
in terms of their business models and modes of operation.
However, none of the above work has explored the idea of
physical keyless car sharing systems.
Martı´nez-Balleste´ et al. [9] introduced the concept of citizen
privacy in smart cities by distinguishing the following five
dimensions: identity privacy, query privacy, location privacy,
footprint privacy and owner privacy. Li et al. [10] analysed
the data over-collection by users’ smartphones, and raised an
alarm for the privacy implications on users. Pan et al. [11]
analysed the smart city concept from a data mining point of
view. They explored different methods for users’ trace analysis
(from location to behaviour inference) and emphasised the
privacy risks of such analysis. Mustafa et al. [12] performed
a security analysis on smart electric vehicle charging system
that allows users to recharge their vehicle on other users’
properties. However, no prior work has analysed the privacy
implication of KSSs.
To fill this research gap, we propose a novel keyless car
sharing system and perform an extensive security and privacy
analysis of such a system.
III. PHYSICAL KEYLESS SHARING SYSTEM (KSS)
This section details the system model, functional require-
ments and interactions among entities for a high-level model
for a KSS.
A. High-Level Model for a KSS
Our high-level model for KSS consists of the following
entities (see Fig. 1).
• Users are individuals, who are willing to share their cars
(i.e., owners) or use cars which are available for sharing
(i.e., consumers). Car owners can provide consumers
such as family members, friends and acquaintances with
permanent or temporary (on demand) access to their cars.
• Keyless Sharing Management Server (KSMS) is a server
(or a complex of servers) that manages the entire KSS.
It aims to provide 1) administrative support such as cars
and users registration, 2) operational functionalities such
as post/search of offers and requests, and car bookings, 3)
key management such as generation, distribution, update
and revocation of keys, and 4) car access management
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Fig. 1. The proposed physical Keyless car Sharing System (KSS).
such as assign, update and revoke access rights for users
to access and use cars.
• Car manufacturer is a company that manufactures cars
and provides car owners with static physical and digital
keys (bounded to the physical key) for their cars. It is also
responsible for the generation, distribution and revocation
of such keys.
• Keyless Sharing On Board Unit (KS-OBU) is an embed-
ded or standalone hardware/software component that is
part of the access management system of the car. It has
a wireless interface such as WiFi, Bluetooth and LTE.
• Keyless Sharing Application (KSApp) is a software appli-
cation developed for mobile devices. Users can interact
with the KSMS via this application.
• Portable Device (PD) is any mobile device such as
smartphone or tablet that can run the KSApp.
• Authorities are any governmental agencies that keep
records of cars’ and their owners’ information such as
car ownership, blacklists for stolen cars, cars’ safety
certificates and users’ driving licence certificates.
• Third Parties (TPs) are any organisations, institutions or
companies that might request data from the KSMS, such
as insurance companies.
B. Functional Requirements
In order to be acceptable to users, our proposed system
should satisfy the following functional requirements.
• Users should be able to share their cars with other users.
In detail, a car owner and a consumer should be able to:
– create a profile (register),
– update and withdraw her profile,
– post car sharing offers and requests,
– search for offers and requests,
– accept or rejects requests,
– use the KSApp on her PD to access a car,
– pay (be paid) for using (sharing her) a car and
– assign/receive reputation scores to/by other users.
• A car owner should be able to:
– generate, update and revoke a temporary digital key
to lock/unlock and drive her car,
– distribute keys to the selected consumers,
– retrieve the car’s drop-off location, and
– determine the car’s location when the car is not
returned and/or stolen.
• A consumer should be able to:
– book a car,
– receive a temporary digital key for the car, and
– retrieve the pickup location of the car.
• The KSMS be should able to manage the following
operations:
– Users’ registration: validate users’ identity and driv-
ing licence.
– Car registration: validate cars’ profile information,
ownership and safety conditions.
– Users’ profile management: manage users’ profile
access, search, update and withdraw.
– Operational management: post and inquire car shar-
ing offers, requests and bookings.
– Key management: generate, distribute, update and
revoke digital keys to the selected users.
– Access management: assign, update and revoke ac-
cess rights to the selected users.
• PDs should not perform computationally heavy opera-
tions as most PDs are resource-constrained devices.
• KS-OBUs should perform all the necessary operations to
allow the selected users to access the reserved cars.
C. Interactions among Entities
The message types and interactions among the entities are
described next.
1) System Setup: A KSS performs all the necessary steps
in order to start offering the car sharing service in order to
obtain the necessary cryptographic keys and certificates.
2) Initialisation Phase: takes place when a user enrolls.
• Users’ registration. A user provides the KSMS with all
the necessary information for the service registration such
as an email address, a proof of her identity (e.g., passport,
identity card), and her driving licence.
• Car registration. An owner provides the KSMS with all
the necessary information for registering her car such as
the type, model, colour, engine and certificates.
3) Pre-sharing Phase: takes place before a car is shared.
• Users profile management. A user may access, store,
update or delete her profile information on the KSMS
via the KSApp on her PD such as her username, age,
contact details and friend circles.
• Operational management. Users may communicate with
the KSMS to perform the following actions.
– An owner (consumer) posts a car sharing offer
(request) which includes: her profile data, her (pre-
ferred) car’s profile data, her (preferred) car’s pickup
and drop-off location, the car’s availability (pre-
ferred) period and the asking (offering) price.
– Users send inquiries to the KSMS for the available
offers or requests. These inquiries contain the same
information as users’ offers or requests.
– If a user is interested in booking a car, the following
operations are performed: (i) a consumer submits a
request to book the car, (ii) the owner receives one or
more requests for the car and (iii) the owner accepts
one of the requests and notifies the selected consumer
or rejects all of the requests.
• Key and access management. The owner generates and
distributes temporary digital keys and assigns access
rights for the car to the selected consumers. Additionally,
the car owner can update and revoke on demand the keys
and privileges for the “misbehaving” consumers. These
actions could be performed with the assistance of the
KSMS.
4) Car-sharing Phase: takes place while a car is shared.
• Accessing the car. The selected consumer uses the re-
ceived key to access the car via the KSApp on her PD.
• Using the car. The car’s KS-OBU monitors whether the
car follows the agreed car sharing conditions such as
duration, distance and region of traveling.
• Returning the car. The car’s KS-OBU and/or the con-
sumer via her PD-KSApp, notifies the owner and the
KSMS for the time and drop-off location of the car.
5) Post-sharing Phase: takes place after a car is shared.
• Billing. The consumer pays the owner the agreed fee for
using the car with the assistance of the KSMS.
• Reputation scores management. The car’s owner (con-
sumer) assigns/receives a reputation score for sharing
(using) a car with the assistance of the KSMS.
IV. THREAT ANALYSIS
This section describes the threat model in detail for each
of the KSS entities and provides an extensive analysis of the
security and privacy threats to the proposed KSS model.
A. Threat Model
Users are untrustworthy or even malicious. A malicious
user might try to passively and/or actively collect and alter
the information stored and exchanged within the KSS in an
attempt to lower the credibility of the system. For instance,
she might try to manipulate the car’s availability period, car’s
profile information (e.g., type, and the number of seats) and
location, in an attempt to gain financial advantages and/or
extract information about other users of a KSS. Such a
malicious user can be a script kiddie, a motivated adversary, or
even a governmental agency. Depending on the resources and
capabilities, a malicious user might try to corrupt a fixed set
of users or either any user of the KSS. However, we assume
that an adversary cannot break the underlying cryptographic
primitives.
KS-OBU is untrustworthy but tamper-evident. An adversary
through the car’s KS-OBU might try to infringe the users’
privacy by means of collecting the passengers’ personal data
during a vehicle’s operation such as car’s location and pas-
sengers’ behaviour [13]. However, we assume that KS-OBU
is equipped with hardware and software security mechanisms
such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [14], [15] to
safely store cryptographic keys, perform cryptographic oper-
ations and validate software updates [14]. Moreover, a KS-
OBU needs to be tamper-evident to detect and keep irrefutable
evidence when an adversary attempts to break or alter the
hardware and software components of the device. We also
assume that the KSMS and the car manufacturers patch
software bugs [16], [17] regularly in order to preclude intrusive
attacks [18], [19] which could make KS-OBUs hazardous to
passengers life [20].
PD-KSApp are untrustworthy but tamper-evident. We as-
sume that PD-KSApp is equipped with security mecha-
nisms to provide access control and protection against data
breaches and/or malware. For instance, a PD-KSApp should
be equipped with a credential management mechanisms [21]
on the mobile device which can encrypt and store users’ pri-
vate keys, passwords and certificates. The PD-KSApp should
also be tamper-evident. Moreover, we assume that only the
legitimate user of a PD-KSApp can access the KSS through
the device using authentication mechanisms. However, an ad-
versary might try to disturb the KSS functionality by sending
invalid requests, or executing only a fraction of the KSS
operations [22].
KSMS and car manufacturer are honest-but-curious or even
semi-honest. Both the KSMS and the car manufacturer might
try to learn and extract information about the KSS users such
as booking preferences of a user, with whom a car owner
is sharing her car with, and with which frequency. However,
we assume that is not in their interest to alter the messages
exchanged and to disrupt the protocol operations of a KSS.
Moreover, the car company and/or the KSMS may try to
disturb the KSS functionality by executing only a fraction of
the KSS operations honestly.
Authorities, third parties and external entities are untrust-
worthy or even malicious. They may try to eavesdrop and
collect information exchanged withing the KSS. Their aim
might be to gain access, collect and/or modify information
exchanged within a KSS, in an attempt to disrupt, and extract
information for users and the KSS. An adversary can be
sophisticated hackers, organized crime or even governmental
agencies that might be capable of taking control of a fixed
set of users or any user of a KSS. However, we assume
that such adversaries are not yet able to break the underlying
cryptographic primitives.
B. Security and Privacy Threat analysis
This section analyses the possible threats for a KSS. The
threat analysis is based on two well-known frameworks:
STRIDE [23]–[25] and LINDDUN [26]. STRIDE mainly
covers the security threats, whereas LINDDUN focuses on
privacy threats. Both of the frameworks are heavily used by
the industry and the research community.
Security Threats
Spoofing. An adversary may attempt to illegally access
a legitimate KSS entity such as a user’s PD-KSApp or the
KSMS. Spoofing attacks introduce functional and trust related
issues, and may have an economic impact to the KSS. For
instance, an adversary may raise the chances of a booking
request to be accepted by impersonating a trusted (for the car
owner) user such as a family member, or a close friend. Re-
garding the economic implications, an adversary may attempt
to benefit from (i) eliminating other car sharing offers, thus
making available only a selected offer, and (ii) making an
impersonated profile to pay for the car she booked and used.
Therefore, it is important to have thorough user registration
procedures and strong entity authentication.
Tampering with data. An adversary may attempt to modify
the information stored and exchanged within the KSS such
as manipulating the car’s availability period, car’s profile
information (type, number of seats) and location. By stating
inaccurate information, an adversary may attempt to lower the
credibility of users or the KSMS. For instance, a user may try
to modify the car’s KS-OBU information for her own benefit;
to alter the travel duration and distance affecting the sharing
cost. Therefore, the integrity and authenticity of the messages
should be guaranteed.
Information disclosure. An adversary may attempt to eaves-
drop messages sent through the KSS. By eavesdropping mes-
sages exchanged among the KSMS, the users’ PD-KSApps,
and the cars’ KS-OBUs, an adversary may attempt to retrieve
critical information about the system such as the digital keys to
access a car, the booking details and the location of a car. For
instance, by collecting such information, an adversary may aim
to reuse the valid messages and the digital keys she obtained to
access a car without the need to prove that she is a legitimate
user. Hence, confidentiality of information must be guaranteed.
Information disclosure also constitutes a privacy threat to users
posing additional risks, such as user profiling.
Repudiation. Disputes may arise when entities (do not)
perform an action and claim the opposite such as stating
inaccurate information about the travelled period and location
of the car. Hence, the non-repudiation of messages exchanged
and actions performed must be guaranteed and disputes must
be consistently resolved.
Denial-of-Service (DoS). DoS attacks aim to make the car
sharing services inaccessible to on or more users. For the
KSS, an adversary may target the KSMS, the cars’ KS-OBUs,
and the users’ PD-KSApps in an attempt to make any KSS
operation unavailable to its users such as post offers/requests,
bookings, and generating, distributing and revoking access car
keys. Moreover, an adversary may attempt to perform a spear
attack targeting specific users. For instance, an adversary may
attempt to raise the likelihood of her offer(s) to be selected by
blocking offers from other users. Therefore, the KSMS should
be safeguarded by network security tools. Furthermore, users’
PD-KSApps and cars’ KS-OBUs should be protected from
malware using software security tools.
Elevation of privilege. An adversary may attempt to gain
elevated access to the resources of the KSS. For instance, an
elevated access can imply that an adversary may attempt to
elevate her profile privileges from (i) consumer to car owner
gaining unlimited access to a car, and (ii) from passenger to car
driver. Moreover, an escalated privilege at KSMS incurs that
an adversary may attempt to execute operations as a system
administrator aiming to retrieve users’ information, alter car
sharing offers/requests and bookings. Thus, to mitigate privi-
lege escalation attacks, authorization mechanisms that comply
with the principle of least privilege for users’ accounts and
processes should be deployed.
Privacy Threats
Linkability. An adversary may attempt to distinguish
whether two or more Items of Interest (IOI) such as messages,
actions and subjects are related to the same user. For instance,
an adversary may try to correlate and deduce whether a user
posted a car sharing request, booked a car, and drove to a
particular location. Hence, unlikability among IOIs must be
guaranteed.
Identifiability. An adversary may attempt to correlate and
identify a user from messages exchanged and actions per-
formed. For instance, an adversary may try to identify a
user by analysing the messages the user exchanges with the
KS-OBU, KSMS and PD-KSApp to access a car. Thus, the
anonymity and pseudonymity of users must be preserved.
Non-repudiation. In contrast to security, non-repudiation
can be used against users’ privacy. An adversary may attempt
to collect evidence stored and exchanged through the KSMS
and the car’s KS-OBU to deduce information about a user.
It may, for example, deduce whether a user drove to a
particular location (clinic). Hence, plausible deniability over
non-repudiation must be guaranteed.
Detectability. An adversary may try to distinguish the type
of IOIs such as messages exchanged among the KSS entities
from random noise. For instance, an adversary may attempt
to identify when a user’s PD-KSApp communicates with
a KSMS and the car’s KS-OBU. Thus, undetectability and
unobservability of IOIs must be guaranteed.
Information disclosure. An adversary may attempt to eaves-
drop and passively collect information exchanged within the
KSS. Information disclosure may affect not only the system’s
security but also users’ privacy such as the profiling of users.
For instance, an adversary may attempt to learn the location
and availability of a car, whether a user is absent from home
and with whom a user is traveling with. Moreover, the user’s
behaviour may be inferred by a systematic collection of the
user’s information [13] by an adversary. For instance, an
adversary may infer the (i) car owners’ sharing preferences
by collecting information about their sharing patterns such as
rental time, duration, and car location, (ii) consumers’ free
time activities by analysing the history of pickup, drop-off,
and drive locations, and (iii) circles of trust by analysing with
whom, when and how often they share their cars, such as
family members, friends and acquaintances. An adversary may
even attempt to infer sensitive information about users such
as their health condition, by identifying users who use cars
for handicap people, or regular visits to hospitals and clinics.
Profiling constitutes a high risk for users’ privacy. Therefore,
the confidentiality of information must be guaranteed.
Content Unawareness. A misbehaving KSS may attempt
to collect more information than necessary from users aiming
to use such information for unauthorised purposes such as
advertisement. For instance, the KSMS may only need to know
whether a user is eligible to drive a car without necessarily the
need to collect personal information about a user such as her
birthday, gender and the country that issued the user’s driving
licence. Moreover, the car’s KS-OBU should only collect the
consumers’ location when necessary such as when a car is not
returned on time or it exceeds the geographical restrictions
agreed during the booking. Hence, the content awareness of
users must be guaranteed.
Policy and Consent Noncompliance. A misbehaving KSS
may attempt to collect, store, and process users’ personal
information in contrast to the principles described in the
European General Data Protection Regulation 2016/680 [27].
For instance, a misbehaving KSMS may attempt to (i) collect
sensitive information about users such as sexual orientation,
religion and political opinions, (ii) export users’ information
to data brokers for revenue, (iii) read users’ contacts from
their PDs, and their Online Social Network profiles on e.g.
Facebook or Google+, and (iv) not allow users to opt out from
the KSS service. A misbehaving KSS may also attempt not to
comply with the Privacy policy that it advertises [28]. Thus,
privacy policies and consent compliance should be guaranteed.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
Based on the threat analysis, this section specifies a set of
security and privacy requirements for the proposed KSS.
A. Security Requirements
To mitigate the aforementioned security threats, security
requirements needs to be put in place aiming to safeguard
and protect the messages exchanges, actions performed and
information stored within the KSS.
Entity Authentication assures to an entity that the identity
of a second entity is the one that is claiming to be. It
aims to mitigate spoofing attacks. Entity authentication is
achieved when a user proves that she (i) knows something
such as passwords, PIN and passcode, (ii) possesses something
such as token, ticket and specific device, (iii) has specific
properties (i.e. use of biometrics), or (iv) with a combination
of these. Regarding passwords, it is important for the KSS to
support strong password policies, and that passwords are sent
encrypted and always stored as salted hashes within the KSS
databases.
Integrity ensures that the information stored and exchanged
within the KSS have not been altered. It aims to mitigate
tampering with data attacks. Integrity is achieved with the use
of hash functions, MAC algorithms and digital signatures.
Confidentiality ensures that only the intended users will be
able to read the information stored and transferred within the
KSS. It aims to mitigate information disclosure attacks. For
instance, confidentiality of the exchanged information needs
to be provided while (i) a user’s PD-KSApp communicates
with a car’s KS-OBU and the KSMS, and (ii) the KSMS
communicates with a car’s KS-OBU. Confidentiality can be
achieved with the use of encryption schemes such as symmet-
ric, asymmetric and homomorphic encryption schemes. Con-
fidentiality can also be combined with message authentication
when authenticated encryption is used.
Non-repudiation is achieved when an entity cannot deny
her action or transaction such as post an offer, book a car and
drive to a particular location. It aims to mitigate repudiation
attacks (disputes). Non-repudiation can be achieved with the
use of digital signatures, timestamps and audit trails.
Availability ensures that the resources of the KSS are
available to legitimate users. It aims to mitigate DoS attacks.
To safeguard availability, network tools are necessary to be
put in place such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
and Intrusion Prevention Systems. To protect the users’ PD-
KSApp and cars’ KS-OBU from malware, software security
tools are necessary such as anti-virus and anti-bot tools.
Authorisation ensures that an entity has access rights to
read, write, and execute resources of the KSS such as files
and operations. It aims to mitigate elevation of privilege
attacks. For authorisation, access control mechanisms need to
be used such as Access Control Lists, and Role Based Access
Control. Moreover, the access control policies should follow
the principle of least privilege for user accounts and processes.
B. Privacy Requirements
To mitigate the specified privacy threats, Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) need to be put in place aiming to
safeguard and protect users’ personal data which will be
exchanged, processed and stored within the KSS.
Unlinkability ensures that two or more IOIs such as mes-
sages exchanged and actions performed cannot be linked to the
same user [29]. It aims to mitigate linkability attacks. Unlinka-
bility can be achieved with the use of pseudonyms [30], anony-
mous credentials [31] and private information retrieval [32].
Anonymity ensures that messages exchanged and actions
performed can not be correlated to a user’s identity. It aims
to mitigate identifiability attacks. Anonymity can be achieved
using Mix-nets [33] and multi-party computation [34].
Pseudonymity ensures that a pseudonym is used instead of
a user’s real identity within the KSS. As anonymity, it aims to
mitigate identifiability attacks. Pseudonymity can be achieved
by using random generators to generate unique and highly
random pseudonyms.
Plausible deniability over non-repudiation ensures that an
adversary cannot prove that a user has performed a specific
action and operation such as drove to a particular location, or
booked a car for a selected period. It aims to mitigate non-
repudiation privacy threats. Plausible deniability, unlike non-
repudiation, is achieved with the use of off-the-record mes-
saging [35]. However, we have to stress that non-repudiation
service should be provided when necessary such as when
more than one entities agreed to trace and identify an action
performed, or a message sent.
Undetectability and unobservability ensures that messages
exchanged and actions performed cannot be distinguished
from others by an adversary as the adversary observes only
noise. It aims to mitigate detectability attacks. Undetectability
and unobservability can be achieved with the use of Mix-nets
and dummy traffic [33].
Confidentiality apart from security is also an important
privacy requirement. It can be achieved using multi-party
computation and private information searches.
Content Awareness aims to raise users’ awareness by better
informing them of the amount and the quality of information
they submit within the KSS. It aims to mitigate the content un-
awareness privacy threats. Content awareness can be achieved
with the use of Transparency Enhancing Technologies such as
privacy nudges [36], dashboards [37], [38] and privacy risk
metrics [39].
Policy and consent compliance aims to ensure the com-
pliance of the KSS with the existing privacy legislations
such as the European General Data Protection Regulation
2016/680 [27] before users accessing the system. It aims
to mitigate the Policy and consent non-compliance privacy
threats. Policy and consent compliance can be achieved with
the use of Data Protection Impact Assessments [40] and
Privacy Impact Assessments [41] analysis of the system such
as data flows, data stores, and processes by data controller
bodies.
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
Although a KSS may provide benefits for users, it also
introduces several security and privacy issues. Concerning
the security issues, the most challenging task is the key
management such as generation, distribution and revocation
of temporary digital keys to a car. The desired property for
this task should be that the temporary keys are user-car-period
specific, i.e., these keys should be valid only for (i) the selected
users (owner and consumers), (ii) the selected car, and (iii) the
agreed period for sharing the car. Most of the threats can be
mitigated by using well-known techniques such as end-to-end
encryption, MAC algorithms and digital signatures. Moreover,
it is important to make this task multi-party dependent. The
owner, consumers, the car and the KSMS should all be
involved in the generation and distribution process of these
keys. Thus, any single party should not be able to generate
the access keys and abuse the system. Multiparty computation
and homomorphic encryption could be used to achieve these
properties. However, developers should take into account the
communication and computational costs of these mechanisms.
Regarding the privacy issues, protecting users’ privacy
against authorised insiders such as the KSMS is probably the
most challenging task. A curious KSMS may be able to infer
personal data about users by analysing (i) consumers’ booking
history such as type of cars, manufacturers and engine power,
(ii) owners’ sharing history such as the rental time, duration
and car location history, and (iii) user friends circles of trust
by analysing how often and with whom an owner (consumer)
share (use) a car such as to (with) family members, friends and
acquaintances. These privacy concerns call for PETs solutions
to be used in the KSS. An example of cost effective and
commonly used PETS are pseudonyms and anonymity systems
(e.g., Tor).
However, a KSS should be able to perform the necessary
operations aiming to provide users with a “good” service.
Therefore, to satisfy all the requirements specified, the pro-
tocol designers should find the “right” balance between the
system’s security and users’ privacy in combination with the
KSS functionality.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a novel keyless car sharing
system that allows users to share their cars with others more
conveniently. First, we devised a high-level model of our
system and described the possible functional requirements and
interactions among system entities. Based on this model and
taking the STRIDE and LINDDUN frameworks as a reference,
we performed a comprehensive threat analysis. Finally, to mit-
igate the identified threats, we specified a set of security and
privacy requirements for such systems. These requirements can
be used as a guide (i) to design secure and privacy-preserving
protocols that support keyless car sharing systems, and (ii)
to perform a risk/threat assessment of protocols that supports
such systems. As a future work, we plan to design a protocol
satisfying all the requirements specified.
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